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THE EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE: INDIA IN
PERSPECTIVE
Deepa Badrinarayana *
Persuading polluters to pay for the damage they cause
elsewhere, in the interest of helping those worst affected,
will be a major challenge in coming decades. Burden
sharing is a very complex issue, and frankly I don't see
much sign of it happening yet.
--Rajendra Pachauri, Chairman IPCC 1
I. INTRODUCTION
A major breakthrough in negotiations was achieved in Bali when
the United States agreed to rejoin negotiations to establish an inter-
national regime to address climate change concerns post-Kyoto.2
Despite U.S. re-engagement, the future of the negotiations and an
effective global climate regime depend on the ability of developed
nations such as the United States and rapidly developing economies
such as China and India to agree on emissions reduction targets and
binding mitigation obligations, and for developed countries to pro-
* Assistant Professor of law, Chapman University School of Law, Orange
California.
1. Laurie Goering, Warming to the Challenge of Climate Change, Chicago
Tribune, Apr.29, 2007, http://inel.wordpress.corn/2007/04/29/rajendra-pachauris-
3-points-on-climate-change/.
2. Juliet Eilperin, Bali Forum Backs Climate 'Road Map,' U.S. Accedes on
Aid Pledges, Wins Fight to Drop Specific Targets for Emissions Cuts, Wash. Post,
Dec. 16, 2007, at A01.
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vide adequate financial and technological aid.3 While such mitiga-
tion based on emission rights is an important point of negotiation, it
nevertheless undercuts the equally important question of violation of
constitutional rights, which are implicated in the case of developing
countries such as India.
India is a constitutional democracy whose growing GDP and emis-
sions make it an important player in global mitigation instruments
and strategies. However, the protection of constitutional rights of
Indians, threatened by the absence of an effective international cli-
mate treaty, is not adequately discussed. In particular, the rights of
Indians whose head count support the Indian government's equitable
claim to emit green house gases (GHGs) based on a per capita calcu-
lation are at stake, but there is no remedy in sight as focus remains
on emission rights-based mitigation strategies.
This article argues that climate change presents a serious challenge
to constitutional rights of Indians; rights that can only be taken away
by the State and by proper legal procedure. Further, as foreign states
are involved and as international and other remedies against these
states are limited, safeguarding constitutional rights presents sub-
stantial challenges that cannot be addressed even through the Indian
judiciary's epistolary jurisprudence. Through this analysis, the arti-
cle aims to demonstrate a less examined issue in international cli-
mate regime discussions-that at stake is a fundamental legal, social
and political document of modem societies.
The first part of the article provides an overview of the global cli-
mate change regime, including a brief scientific background. The
second part discusses India's status and position with respect to cli-
mate change, including mitigation strategies and adaptation chal-
lenges. The third part examines the potential constitutional chal-
lenges that could arise due to climate change. The fourth and the
fifth parts discuss the scope for judicial action and their limits, fol-
lowed by concluding remarks.
3. See generally Andrew C. Revkin, As China Goes, So Does Global Warm-
ing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/weekinre-
view/i 6revkin.html.
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II. CLIMATE CHANGE-BRIEF BACKGROUND OF SCIENCE,
ECONOMICS AND LAW
The scientific proposition that certain human activities increase the
concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 4 present in the atmos-
phere and accelerate the rise in global temperature levels, conse-
quently launching unpredictable and catastrophic changes in climate
patterns, was first put forth in the 19 th century. 5 Concrete scientific
efforts to understand weather as phenomena influenced by complex
and continuous interaction between natural events and anthropogenic
actions began towards the latter half of the 2 0 th century.6 Several
scientific research activities have been undertaken by government-
funded institutions, 7 independent research centers, 8 and other initia-
tives, notably, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), which was established in 1988 jointly by the World Mete-
orological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environ-
4. The main GHGs are: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, CFC-12,
HCFC-22, perflouro methane, and sulfur hexafluoride; of these, only the first three
exist naturally in the atmosphere. Prior to industrialization, their concentrations in
parts per million (or billion) by volume (ppmv/ppbv) was 278 ppmv, 700 ppbv,
and 275 ppbv, respectively. These have increased by 30%, 240%, and 15% respec-
tively since 1994 due to human activities. However, of the three, C02 has the
highest potential for global warning in the short and the long terms. See Mark
Maslin, Global Warming, A Very Short Introduction, tbl.1, 16-17 (OUP Oxford
2004).
5. Tim Flannery, The Weather Makers 36-43 (Text 2005). See also Daniel
Bodansky, The History of the Global Climate Change Regime, International Rela-
tions and Global Climate Change 23 (Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz eds.,
MIT Press 2001).
6. Bodansky supra note 5 at 153-65. See also Maslin, supra note 4, at 23-25.
7. For instance, the United Kingdom meteorological office has established
the Hadley Center on Climate Prediction and Research to study the effects of cli-
mate change and advise the government, corporations, and international organiza-
tions. See http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/hadleycentre/; the US Environ-
mental Protection Administration has set up a Climate Change Science Program,
see http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/policy/ccsp.html, and the Goddard Space
Flight Center of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has
special ongoing programs on climate change and global warming; in fact, a compi-
lation of links to key climate change programs in the United States and abroad is
provided by NASA, at http://globalchange.nasa.gov/Resources/pointers/glob_
warm.html.
8. In the United States, for instance, the Pew Center has established an exten-
sive climate research program. See Pew Center, http://www.pewclimate.org/.
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ment Program (UNEP)9 to build a global scientific database to aid
global scale action.
After nearly a half-century of controversial and contentious discus-
sions, most scientific bodies, including IPCC, which is the closest
representation of a global position on the issue, agree that anthropo-
genic emissions of greenhouse gases have been accelerating average
global temperature increases since the beginning of the industrial
era. In fact, dire consequences are predicted, unless the acceleration
is limited to a two degree Celsius increase by the end of the century,
as compared with 1990 levels. 1 IPCC has concluded that there is a
very high likelihood that failure to achieve the two degree Celsius
limit will result in a climate "tipping point," unleashing irreversible
non-linear, exponential, long-term impacts and feedback effects."
The intensity of the catastrophes in such an event would vary re-
gionally; areas such as sub-Saharan Africa and small-island coun-
tries will possibly be most affected by increased droughts, hurri-
canes, and rising sea levels. 12 Even though some scientists challenge
these findings,' most scientists now agree that there is sufficient
basis to justify, in fact catalyze, global emissions reductions.
Translating scientific recommendations into action, however, is
perceived as a threat to the evolving socio-economic stability of hu-
man civilization. Much like stable climatic conditions, hydrocarbon-
based economic growth has contributed to human settlement and
9. See IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm.
10. See Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Understanding and Respond-
ing to Climate Change, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Cli
mate101-FULL_121406_065519.pdf; see also Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change, Fourth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007. Synthesis Report,
Summary for Policy Makers (IPCC Synthesis Report 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syrspm.pdf.
11. Until the report was published several possible linear forcing scenarios
were predicted. See Maslin, supra note 4, fig. 5, at 18-21(the non-linear result is
also explained as the equivalent of pushing a car over the edge, and once at the
edge, even a small shove would be sufficient to get the car rolling non-stop till it
slows down on its own when it finds a new stable ground).
12. IPCC Synthesis Report 2007, supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., Richard Lindzen, Editorial, Climate of Fear, Global-warming
Alarmists Intimidate Dissenting Scientists into Silence, Wall St. J., Opinion Jour-
nal, Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.opinionjoumal.com/extra/?id=l 10008220 ( arguing
that minority scientists' findings, even though well-substantiated, are muted by
majority views). See also Toni Johnson, Alternative Views on Climate Change,
Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 28, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/
14318/alternativeviews on climate_change.html.
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progress in many parts of the world; 14 free trade has launched new
opportunities for several more countries to become industrialized
and progress economically. 15 In fact, during the early stages of sci-
entific research, noted economists from several countries concluded
that global action on climate change was not economically feasible,
desirable, or even necessary.16
However, this economic viewpoint is changing. Notably, the Stem
Review Report' 7 on the economics of climate change concluded that
the cost of inaction would be higher than the cost of mitigating cli-
mate change. According to the Review, measures to reduce climate
change would cost only about 1% of the gross domestic product
(GDP) of the global economy, whereas climate change would reduce
global GDP by 20%. Although the Review has been criticized for
several reasons-that its estimate of the costs of climate change is
very low and that its overall conclusions are erroneous8-the Re-
port has nevertheless swung the debate in the direction of the eco-
nomic benefits of investing in green house gas reduction, via carbon
taxes and emissions trading. 19
14. See Flannery, supra note 5, at 69-79. See generally Daniel Yergin, The
Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (Free Press 1991).
15. See generally Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty 18 (Penguin Press 2005);
see also Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (Anchor 2000).
16. See, e.g. (R1.2), The Copenhagen Consensus (2004),
http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/. (A panel comprising economists, includ-
ing some Nobel laureates-Jagdish Bhagawati (Columbia University), Robert
Fogel (University of Chicago, Nobel laureate), Bruno Frey (University of Zurich),
Justin Yifu Lin (Peking Douglass North of Washington University in St Louis,
Nobel laureate), Thomas Schelling (University of Maryland), Vernon Smith
(George Mason, Nobel laureate), and Nancy Stokey (University of Chicago)-
concluded that any investment in climate change via the Kyoto Protocol or carbon
taxes was a bad investment/project. Similarly, a House of Lords Special Commit-
tee on Economic Affairs published a report, The Economics of Climate Change,
expressing skepticism about basing economic decisions on IPCC's scientific find-
ings). See Nigel Lawson, Against Kyoto, Prospect Magazine, November 2005 at
116 available at http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/articledetails.php?id=7117.
17. Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independentreviews/
stemrevieweconomics climatechange/stemreviewindex.cfm.
18. See, e.g, The Stern Review: A Dual Critique, World Economics, Vol. 7,
No. 4, Dec. 2006, available at http://www.world-economics-journal.com. See also
Expert Reaction to Stern Review, BBC News, Oct. 30, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/business/609812.htm.
19. In fact, Sir Nicholas Stern appeared before the two US Senate Committees-
-Environment and Energy-to present his findings, and urged law-makers to
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Giving effect to the imperative scientific recommendation through
law and policy is equally, if not more, contentious. A global legal
regime to address climate change was established in 1992 at the Rio
Conference, when several UN Members signed the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).2 ' The
agreement set out the basic structure for establishing legal obliga-
tions among countries to reduce greenhouse gases; detailed obliga-
tions were set out in the Kyoto Protocol, which was opened for sig-
nature in 1997.21
The Kyoto Protocol allocated emissions quotas to all countries,
keeping 1990 as the baseline year, and required nations that had his-
torically contributed to the problem to undertake binding obligations
to reduce emissions within a fixed time period.22 The Protocol also
provided several economic based incentives for reducing emissions,
notably provisions for emissions trading, joint implementation, and
clean development mechanisms.
Emissions trading, or carbon trading, facilitated the sale, and pur-
chase, of carbon credits among countries, based on their Kyoto allo-
cations; joint implementation allowed countries to collaboratively
invest in projects that would reduce emissions and generate carbon
credits; clean development mechanisms allowed developed countries
to invest in emission-reducing technologies, particularly in develop-
ing countries, in return for carbon credits.23
launch a carbon tax or emissions system. While both industries (for instance CEO
of Pacific Gas & Electrical) and some Senators responded positively, few believed
that response was imminent. See J.R. Pegg, U.S. Lawmakers Hear Stern Warnings
on Climate Change, Environment News Wire, Feb. 2007, http://www.ens-
newswire.comens/feb2007/2007-02-14-1 0.asp.
20. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 31 I.L.M.
849 (1992) (entered into force May 21, 1994).
21. Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification, May 11, 2007, http://unfccc.de;
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (entered into force Feb. 15, 2005).
22. See Anita M. Halvorssen, Common, But Differentiated Commitments in the
Future Climate Change Regime-Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include Annex
C and The Annex C Mitigation Fund, 18 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 247
(2007). The reasons for differentiating between developed and developing coun-
tries on grounds of economic differences and historic contributions to the build up
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is specifically recognized and acknowl-
edged in the Preamble to UNFCCC, UNFCCC, see www.unfcc.ch.
23. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for parties to trade in emissions
to meet their obligations or benefit economically from their excess emission cred-
its; Article 6 provides for Annex I countries to undertake joint efforts to reduce
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However, the Kyoto Protocol provoked several negative reactions,
notably, from the United States, which withdrew completely from
the Protocol, 24 and also from the nongovernmental sector and from
economists. 25 Newly industrializing nations such as Brazil, China,
and India balked at the U.S. government's position that these coun-
tries should also undertake mandatory obligations given their grow-
ing rate of emissions. As a result of the controversy, the Protocol and
its mechanisms did not come into effect until 2005, nearly a decade
after its being open for signature and six years before its expira-
tion.2
6
Countries that ratified the Protocol, including the European Union
(EU) and Japan, have established carbon-trading mechanisms.27 In
fact, Japan recently received its carbon offsets.28 Further, even
within non-ratifying countries, emissions reduction policies are be-
ing developed. For example, U.S. states have independently taken
initiatives to reduce carbon emissions through internal trading
mechanisms, and other regulations; 29 even the Senate is poised to
emissions; Article 12 allows Annex I countries with obligations to reduce emis-
sions to invest in projects in developing countries, so that they can get credits for
reducing emission levels. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21, available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html. See also Farhana Yamin and
Joanna Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime, A Guide to Rules,
Institutions and Procedures, 74-136 (2004).
24. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution passed by the U.S. Senate unanimously, 95-0,
expressly advised the Clinton Administration not to accept binding obligations
under the Kyoto Protocol unless developing countries did the same. Byrd-Hagel
Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105 th Cong. 1997. See also Letter to Members of the Sen-
ate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, 37 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 444
(Mar. 13, 2001) (for a statement by President Bush rejecting the Kyoto Protocol).
25. See, e.g., Richard N. Cooper, Toward A Real Global Warming Treaty,
Foreign Affairs, March/April 1998.
26. See Daniel Wallis, Russia Ratifies Kyoto, Planet Ark, Nov. 19, 2004,
http://www.planetark.com/ (announcing that the Kyoto Protocol would become
effective from February 2005 with Russia's signature adding the requisite ratifica-
tion requirement).
27. See EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), http://ec.europa.eu/envi
ronment/climat/emission.htm. See also Marjan Peeters and Kurt Deketelaere, EU
Climate Change Policy (Marjan Peeters and Kurt Deketelaere eds., Edward Elgar
2006).
28. Japan Becomes First Nation to Receive Carbon Offsets, Daily News, Nov.
19, 2007, http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/resources/dailyjnews/japan-be-
comes first nation to receive carbon offsets.
29. See generally Michael Gerrard, Global Climate Change and US Law (Mi-
chael Gerrard ed., American Bar Association 2007).
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introduce significant legislations. 30 Developing countries such as
India and China have also adopted policies to reduce emissions from
certain sectors and promote renewable energy. 31 Also, Australia,
which had refused to ratify the Protocol unless China and India ac-
cepted binding obligations, declared that it would ratify the Kyoto
accord, at the thirteenth meeting of the Conference of Parties held in
Bali in December 2007.32
Currently, of the major emitters, China, India and the United States
are the only countries that have refused to accept binding emissions
under the Kyoto Protocol. 33 An effective post-Kyoto regime, there-
fore, depends directly on the position taken by these countries in the
negotiations launched at Bali.34
III. CLIMATE CHANGE-INDIA IN PERSPECTIVE
Currently, India is ranked as one of the top five emitters of green-
house gas emissions,35 but as a developing country whose industrial
process began in the later half of the 20 t century it does not bear
historical responsibility for carbon dioxide reduction targets.
36
30. See generally Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which
Federal Climate Change Legislative Proposal is "Best"?, 102 NW. U. L. Rev.
123 (2007), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/collo-
quy/2007/32/LRCoIl2007n32Flatt.pdf; for more information on Senate's new
CAFE standards see Christian Edstrom, Will That Be Skim in Your CAFE?, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/13/will-that-be-
skim-in-your-cafe/; see also Edward Luce & Bernard Simon, Carmakers Battle
Tougher Rules, FiN. TIMES, July 26, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cb97e0d8-
3bbf- 11 dc-8002-0000779fd2ac,sO 1 = 1 .html?nclickcheck= 1.
31. Infra 9-17.
32. See Rod McGuirk, Australia Signs Up to Ratifying Kyoto, Wash. Post,
Dec. 3, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/
03/AR2007120300135.html.
33. Id.
34. For an analysis of the various conflicting interests of negotiating an appro-
priate global agreement, see Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of
Two Protocols, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
35. See Development Data Group of the Development Economics Vice Presi-
dency and the Environment Department of the World Bank, The Little Green Data
Book (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2007) (2001),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDATASTA/64199955-
1178226923002/21322619/LGDB2007.pdf.
36. Infra note 49.
[VOL. XlX
2009] CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 9
Moreover, despite having a 4.23% share of the global emissions,
37
which excludes the 10% global emissions share from land use shifts
such as deforestation, 38 the sub-continent's overall position on the
issue is less troubling than that of other emitters, particularly China
and the United States.
According to a recent Climate Change Performance Index, India's
energy-related emissions are much lower than that of China or
United States, which contributed 18.80% and 21.44%, respectively
in 2007. 39 Further, India's global share 40 remains relatively low de-
spite the fact that its share of the global population is 17.02%, 4' and
its share of the global GDP is close to that of Japan at 6.16%, in ef-
fect the fourth largest economy among the top emitters.42 In fact,
India a high ranking of five for its climate performance in 2007; this
figure is closer to that of Germany and United Kingdom that are un-
dertaking critical measures to address the problem, and much higher
than that of most other top emitters including Canada, China, Italy,
37. Jan Burck et al., Climate Change Performance Index 2008 (CCPI), Ger-
man Watch (2008), tbl.5, http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/ccpi2008.pdf (the
percentage of emissions is based on emissions from energy, transport (including
air), residential, and industry sectors).
38. Brazil and Indonesia are the other two major contributors to emissions
from land-use shifts, such as deforestation. Id. at fig. 1. However, in the COP 13
meeting held in Bali, developing countries including India and Brazil agreed to
discuss emissions from deforestation as part of treaty negotiations to replace
Kyoto. See, Summary of the Thirteenth Conference of Parties to the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change and Third Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol, 3-15 December 2007, 12 Earth Negotiations Bull. 354, Dec. 18, 2007,
available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enbl2354e.pdf.
39. See CCPI, supra note 37. Also, between 1990 and 2004, China's C02
emissions in metric tons increased from 2,398.9 to 5,007.1, the United States from
4818.3 to 6045.8, and India from 681.7 to 1342.1. United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) Human Development Index, Statistics of the Human Develop-
ment Report, 2007/2008 Human Development Index Rankings (UNDP HDI),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/.
40. According to UNDP Human Development Index, between 1990 and 2004,
India's global share increased from 3 to 4.6%; China's from 10.6 to 17.3%; but the
global share of United States went down from 21.2 to 20.9 %. UNDP HDI, supra
note 39.
41. China and United States' global population share is 20.39% and 4.61%,
respectively, id.
42. United States' global GDP share is 20.13%; China's 14.75%; and Japan's
6.36%, id.
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Japan, Republic of Korea, The Russian Federation, and the United
States were ranked in the high 40s and 50s.
43
India also leads the chart of top emitters that are demonstrating
positive emissions trends. 44 India's growth has not been accompa-
nied by high escalation of emissions despite its increasing depend-
ence on coal.45 In comparison, economic growth in China has been
accompanied by a 3% per capita increase in emissions.46 As such,
India outpaces China with respect to emission levels, trends in emis-
sion increases, and overall climate change performance; India is
ranked among the top ten nations performing well, as opposed to
China, which is ranked in the 40s and 50s. The only area where
China leads is on climate policy; it is ranked seventh.47
However, India is not far behind with a rank of fourteen, and is
also fourth in the upward curve of countries that are adopting sound
climate policy. 48 In 2002, India acceded to the Kyoto Protocol, al-
though neither the Protocol nor UNFCC obligate the Government of
India to reduce its GHG emissions.49 Nevertheless, the administra-
tion is undertaking several voluntary measures that will slow down
GHG emission increases. These measures include promotion of re-
newable energy 50 and investments in clean development technolo-
43. Id. at tbl.3.
44. Russia follows close behind, with Canada, China and United States trailing
at the bottom. CCPI, supra note 37 at fig.5.
45. CCPI predicts that China and India will jointly rack up a 72% demand for
the period 2004-2030, id.
46. Id. However, both countries remain below their quota or target limits under
Kyoto. According to UNDP's Human Development Index, between 1990 and
2004, India's per capita emissions increased from .8 to 1.2 %; China's from 2.1 to
3.8%. Incidentally, the U.S. per capita emission increased from 19.3 to 20.6% and
Canada's from 15 to 20%.
47. In fact, the Chinese Government is committed to adopting several climate
positive policies. CCPI, supra note 37.
48. Germany, China, and the United Kingdom hold the top three positions. Id.
at fig.7.
49. Under Article 2(a)-(b) of the UNFCCC, only developed countries and
other Annex I countries are required to stabilize emissions by adopting appropriate
national policies and regularly submit progress reports. See UNFCCC, supra note
20, art. II. Further, under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I countries are
required to reduce their GHG emissions to at least 5% below 1990 levels between
2008-2012, and have been assigned specific emission quotas under Annexes A and
B, see Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21 at art. III.
50. The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, which began as a Depart-
ment of Non-Conventional Energy Sources within the Ministry of Energy in the
1970s was recast as a new ministry in 2006. It is exploring alternatives such as
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gies. 5 1 The Government has also adopted energy regulations 52 and
established new ministries or administrative agencies.53 It has also
set up special committees, including one headed by IPCC Chairper-
son, Rajendra Pachauri and other prominent government and non-
government representatives, to consider additional venues for ac-
tion.54
Yet, despite the positive trends, India's climate scenario is not en-
tirely encouraging. Within the country, competing policies and inter-
ests present significant challenges to ongoing mitigation efforts.
Demand for energy and carbon intensive materiai s to sustain devel-
opment activities has risen exponentially. Notably, there is increas-
ing demand for electricity for hi-tech industries and for modem
solar, wind, hydropower and biogas substitutes. See Ministry of Renewable En-
ergy, Annual Report (2005-2006), available at http://mnes.nic.in/annualre-
portI2005_2006_English/index.htm. See also Administrative Circular Notification,
No. 24/l/1993-Admn.II, Government of India, October 20, 2006.
51. According to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, "[t]he purpose of the clean
development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in
achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of
the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance
with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article
3." Kyoto Protocol, supra note 21 at art. XII. This means Annex I and non-Annex
I countries facilitate projects that would support low-emission development, which
would reduce potential increases in emissions in the non-Annex I country and
which would count towards the Annex I country's emissions reduction. In effect,
contributing to the prevention of increased emissions in one country would be
treated as an effort towards stabilization of GHGs to 1990 levels. A list of CDM
projects underway in India is available, see CDM India, http://cdmindia.nic.in.
52. See The Energy Conservation Act, 1991, No. 52, §lActs of Parliament,
(2001) (when the Energy Conservation Act (ECA) was passed in 2001 to promote
efficient use of energy), available at http://www.bee-
india.nic.in/EC%20Act/Extraordinary.htm.
53. The Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) was created under ECA and is
comprised of ministers of Central and State energy-related agencies. BEE is work-
ing with key industries including cement, aluminum, paper and pulp, to establish
voluntary energy-efficient practices. It is also drafting standards for energy label-
ing, building codes, certification programs, among other initiatives. See generally,
Bureau of Energy Efficiency, Engagement of Retainer Consultant for National
Energy Conservation Awards 2008 (NECA - 2008) programme of BEE, p. 7, .§ 1.1,
1.2, 2.3, 4.3, available at http://www.bee-india.nic.in/sidelinks/Announcement/
eca08/EOINECA08_RetainerConsultant.pdf.
54. Divya Gandhi, Committee on Climate Change Set Up, The Hindu, May 11,
2007, http://www.thehindu.com/2007/05/1 I/stories/2007051102381300.htm.
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amenities such as air conditioners and cars; 55 for materials to build
infrastructure for the spiraling land and air traffic; and for cement for
commercial and residential construction. 56  These energy require-
ments have driven the Government to exploit domestic coal reserves,
and have increased its dependence on petroleum resources 57, despite
growing emphasis on weaning away from traditional fuel.58 Further,
the administration's focus on encouraging internal and foreign direct
investments to jumpstart some of the above mentioned projects, par-
ticularly infrastructure building-power plants construction, marine
ports, telecommunications and real estate 59-threaten to undermine
55. Indian car manufacturer, the Tata Group, is poised to introduce the first
line of low-priced cars, which has raised concerns about the impact on C02 emis-
sions, and other pollution. See Jo Johnson, Green Activists concerned over Peo-
ple's Car, Fin. Times, Jan. 9, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fcl 1648e-be3f-
1 ldc-8bc9-0000779fd2ac.html.
56. See P.R. Shukla, et al., Development and Climate: An Assessment of India,
Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, May 2003 (on file with author. For
explaining the growing demand for electricity in Asia, notably in India and China,
and their reliance on coal, see also, Steven Ferrey, Why Electricity Matters, Devel-
oping Nations Matter, and Asia Matters Most of All, 15 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 113
(2007); India's Initial National Communications to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, (hereinafter Natcom 2004) (Ministry of Environ-
ment and Forests, Government of India 2004). See generally Daniel Yergin, Den-
nis Eklof & Jefferson Edmond, Fueling Asia's Recovery, 77 Foreign Aff. 34
(1998) (discussing Asia's future fuel needs, for transport and market growth, in the
context of energy security).
57. See Steven Ferrey, Why Electricity Matters, Developing Nations Matter,
and Asia Matters Most of All, 15 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 113 (2007), explaining the
growing demand for electricity in Asia, notably India and China, and their reliance
on coal. See also Natcom 2004, supra note 56. See generally Daniel Yergin, Den-
nis Eklof & Jefferson Edmond, Fueling Asia's Recovery, 77 Foreign Aff. 34
(1998) (discussing Asia's future fuel needs, for transport and market growth, in the
context of energy security).
58. The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy estimates that only 5-6% of
energy will be produced through renewable resources. See Ministry of Renewable
Energy, Annual Report (2005-2006), supra note 50. See also Administrative Cir-
cular Notification, No. 24/l/1993-Admn.II, Government of India, October 20,
2006. See also David Sandalow, Freedom from Oil (McGraw Hill 2008), for a
discussion on the problems of reliance on traditional oil.
59. The Indian Electricity Act of 2003 gives incentives such as a fixed return
on investment of 16%, removal of licensing requirements to operate and maintain
power-generation stations, participation in distribution and transmission with li-
cense from a newly created Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC),
provision for selling power directly without government intervention, and the crea-
tion of a separate Appellate Tribunal for Electricity. The Government is also draft-
ing an Open Skies Policy and an Airport Economic Regulatory Authority to ex-
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environmental impact assessment legislation,6 ° which is being used
in other jurisdictions such as the United States to measure climate
change impacts of a project, even if with limited success. 6 1 This is
especially worrisome if one considers the U.S. Department of En-
ergy's prediction that at the current growth rate India's C02 emis-
sions could increase between 72 and 225% by 2025,62 which, re-
gardless of the fact that at 5% its global contribution will be lower
pand modem construction of airports. See Mark J. Riedy and Andrews Kurth,
Project Finance India 2007-Overcoming Hurdles to Growth: Current Trends and
Innovative Transactional Structures in India, 1587 Practicing Law Institute 143
(2007). See also Nandan Nelivigi, Doug Peel, & Christopher Krishnamoorthy,
Infrastructure Project Finance in India: Recent Developments, 1587 Practicing
Law Institute 133(2007).
60. For instance, the Govindrajan Committee specifically recommended the
removal of hurdles to infrastructure development, especially EIA. See Government
of India, Report on Reforming Investment Approval & Implementation Proce-
dures, Part-I (Investment approval procedures-Government and Public Sector
Projects) (2002), http://dipp.nic.in/implrepo/implrepol.pdf. See also Ritu Paliwal,
EIA Practice in India and its Evaluation using SWOT Analysis, 26 Environmental
Impact Assessment Review 492, 492-510 (July 2006).
61. For example, in the United States, litigation seeking application of NEPA
to assess impacts of major federal actions on climate change have been increased,
especially in 2007, although with partial success. In Ctr. for Biological Diversity
v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508 (9 h Cir. 2007), the Circuit
court held that National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's rule setting
CAFE standards for light trucks was flawed because it had not prepared an envi-
ronmental impact statement considering the effects of greenhouse gases. However,
many district courts have dismissed claims that an EIS should consider climate
impacts. See, e.g., Audubon Naturalist Soc'y of the Cent. Atl. States, Inc. v. Dep 't
of Transp., 524 F. Supp. 2d 642 (D. Md. 2007); N. Slope Boroughs v. Minerals
Mgmt. Serv., No. 3:07-cv-0045-RRB, slip op. (D. Alaska Apr 12, 2007); Border
Power Plant Working Group v. Dep 't of Energy, 467 F. Supp 2d 1040 (S.D. Cal.
2006), in which the US District Court of Southern California held that the gov-
ernment was not required under NEPA to conduct impact assessment to measure
increase in carbon dioxide emissions by taking into account emissions from plants
in Mexico before constructing utility plants. However, the State Environmental
Policy Act (SEPA) has been enlisted by many States to assess climate impacts. See
Dustin T. Till, Assessing Climate Change-Trends under State Environmental
Policy Acts and the National Environmental Policy Act, Envitl.Impact Assessment
Comm. Newsl (ABA, Sec. of Env't, Energy, & Resources, Chicago, IL.), Nov.
2007, at 2-6.
62. See Kevin Baumert et al., Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data
and International Climate Policy Part XII (World Resources Inst. 2005).
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than that of China, Europe and United States, 63 would threaten the
goal of curbing temperature increases at two degrees Celsius.
In short, increase in trade and commerce is driving up India's GDP
and its emissions. Therefore, given its steady economic growth64 the
Government of India is under international pressure to accept bind-
ing obligations post-Kyoto, much like Annex I nations. 65 Thus, the
Government faces the uphill challenge of designing and maintaining
policies that balance economic growth and climate change mitiga-
tion. It has responded by focusing on alternative energy options,
even though they can neither fuel its current developmental de-
mands, nor adequately minimize the country's impact on climate
change.
Much more alarming, however, are the potential effects of climate
change within the sub-continent. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) 66 predicts that glacial melts in the Himala-
yan region alone will increase flooding, trigger avalanches and land-
slides, and cause extinction of species and ecosystems. 67 As such,
63. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Int'l Energy Outlook, 9 (2006), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/ieoreftab_10.pdf (Europe and United States
are predicted to have a global share of 23.3, 16.3, and 18.6 percent, respectively).
64. India's GDP has grown steadily by about 8% in the last few years. See
Reserve Bank of India Press Release, RBI Increases Cash Reserve Ratio, (2007),
http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BSViewBulletin.aspx?Id=8333.
65. In legal terms, India would have to accept emissions reduction obligations
within a fixed period of time, like other Annex I Parties as explained in Article 2,
Kyoto. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 49.
66. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, comprising scientific
experts from a select number of countries, was established in 1988 by the Execu-
tive Council of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), with support
from UNEP, to identify "uncertainties and gaps in "present knowledge" about
climate change and its potential impacts; gather information "to evaluate policy
implications" and "response strategies;" "review.. .national/international policies"
regarding GHGs; and carry out "scientific and environmental assessments regard-
ing GHG emissions and transfer them for relevant governmental and intergovern-
mental agencies. These functions are divided among three Working Groups-
available scientific information on climate change, environmental and socio-
economic impacts of climate change, and formulation of response strategies,
which have published regular reports since 1990. See Intergovernmental Panel of
Climate Change (IPCC), 16 Years of Scientific Assessment in Support of the Cli-
mate Convention, at 2, (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/lOth-
anniversary/anniversary-brochure.pdf.
67. Climate Change 2007 Impacts, Adaptability and Vulnerability, IPCC,
Working Group II Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change Fourth Assessment Report, Summary for Policy Makers (2007), available
at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf. See also
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Himalayan glaciers, including the Gangotri, which is a source of the
perennial and holy river Ganga, have receded by thirty meters, en-
dangering water supply in the dry season.68 Other changes in hydro-
logical cycles are also expected to cause extreme drought or flood
conditions; 69 shorten crop duration periods to the detriment of agri-
cultural yields, 70 threaten biological diversity, 71 increase risk of ma-
Andrew C. Revkin, Poor Nations to Bear the Brunt as World Warms, N. Y.
Times, April 1, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/O1/science/
earth/l1climate.html. As described in the section on the Asia scenario, "Glacier
melt in the Himalayas is projected to increase flooding, and rock avalanches from
destabilized slopes, and to affect water resources within the next two decades to
three decades. This will be followed by decreased river flows as the glaciers re-
cede. Freshwater availability in Central, South, East and Southeast Asia, particu-
larly in large river basins, is projected to decrease due to climate change which,
along with population growth and increasing demand arising from higher stan-
dards of living could adversely affect more than a billion people by the 2050s.
Coastal areas, especially heavily-populated mega-delta regions in South, East and
Southeast Asia, will be at greater risk due to increased flooding from the sea and,
in some mega-deltas, flooding from the rivers. Climate change is projected to im-
pinge on sustainable development of most developing countries of Asia, as it com-
pounds the pressures on natural resources and the environment associated with
urbanization, industrialization, and economic development. It is projected that
crop yields could increase up to 20% in East and Southeast Asia while they could
decrease up to 30% in Central and South Asia by the mid-21st century. Taken to-
gether and considering the influence of rapid population growth and urbanization,
the risk of hunger is projected to remain very high in several developing countries.
Endemic morbidity and mortality due to diarrhoeal disease primarily associated
with floods and droughts is expected to rise in East, South and Southeast Asia due
to projected changes in the hydrological cycle associated with global warming.
Increases in coastal water temperature would exacerbate the abundance and/or
toxicity of cholera in South Asia." Id.
68. Emily Wax, A Sacred River Endangered by Global Warming, Wash. Post,
June 17, 2007, at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/16/ AR2007061600461 .html.
69. See A.K. Gosain, Sandhya Rao, & Debajit Basuray, Climate Change Im-
pact Assessment on Hydrology of Indian River Basins, 90 No. 3 Current Science
346, 346-53 (2006). The studies cover the Krishna and the Mahanadi river basins,
but as the authors point out, India comprises of thirteen major river basins and
much more works needs to be done to determine the impact of climate change on
all of them.
70. Jayant Sathaye, P.R. Shukla, & N.H. Ravindranath, Climate change, sus-
tainable development and India: Global and national concerns, 90 No. 3 Current
Science,314, 314-25 (2006).
71. N.H. Ravindranath, N.V. Joshi, R. Sukumar & A. Saxena, Impact of Cli-
mate Change on Forests in India, 90 No. 3 Current Science 354, 354-61 (2006).
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larial outbreaks by creating conditions favorable to disease carrying
72 7vectors; and increase cyclones in coastal regions. 7
As such, India's record on managing weather-related calamities is
rather dismal. According to a Climate Risk Index, which rates coun-
tries' weather risk record that is not attributed to climate change,74
India was ranked ninth among the ten most affected countries for the
period 1995-2004; during this same period, the Human Development
t75Index (HDI) ranked India 127 h in the world.75 In fact, India was
ranked first for long term deaths in the same period; even though this
was not the case in 2006, the country remained in the list of top ten
countries prone to weather related calamities.
76
The only area that India did not top the HDI list was for GDP
losses, which was noted to be generally higher in developed coun-
tries, primarily because of insurance and similar costs, which most
affected people in developing countries, including India, cannot af-
ford.77 However, according to another study, India is predicted to
suffer the highest GDP loss from climate change, more than Africa,
if there is a 2.5 degree Celsius increase in global temperature and
climate change.78
An early indication of the implications of such losses is already
becoming evident in some parts of the country. In 2007 an Indian
farmer was reportedly forced to abandon his ancestral agricultural
72. Sumana Bhattacharya, C. Sharma, R.C. Dhiman & A.P. Mitra, Climate
change and Malaria in India, 90 No. 3 Current Science 369, 369-75 (2006). See
also Health Ministry Warns of Spurt in Diseases, The Indian Express, May 16,
2007.
73. A.S. Unnikrishnan, K. Rupa Kumar, Sharon E. Fernandes, G.S. Michael &
S.K. Patwardhan, Sea level changes along the Indian Coast: Observations and
Projections, 90 No. 3 Current Science 362, 362-68 (2006). (The authors predict
that the intensity and number of cyclone activities will rise in the Bay of Bengal
and the Arabian Sea between 2041 and 2060).
74. Sven Anemfiller, Stephan Monreal, & Christoph Bals, German Watch,
Global Climate Risk Index 2006, Weather Related Loss Events and their Impacts
on countries in 2004 and in Long Term Comparison,
http://www.germanwatch.org/klak/cri06.pdf. The ranking is based on four fac-
tors-Aeath tolls, deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (which in the case of India is
balanced against the population), amount of overall losses in USD, and overall
losses in relation to GDP.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See William Nordhaus & Joseph Boyer, Warming the World: Economic
Models of Global Warming, 91 (MIT Press 2000).
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land, which was part of one of two islands submerged in the Sunder-
bans region due rise to a rise in sea level. 79 Another farmer faces a
similar threat. Absent compensation and support from the Gov-
ernment, the former moved to urban areas in search of alternative
livelihood, whereas the latter stayed on despite the risk of future
flooding and limited access to food.8 1 Both incidents, which have
been attributed to climate change related sea level rise, portend the
fate of nearly 65% of India's population that is dependent on agricul-
ture, forestry and fisheries for a living. 8
2
In balance, even though India's current climate change perform-
ance is encouraging, future increases in emission levels remains a
critical concern, and its adaptation challenges are intimidating. Fur-
ther, despite India's climate mitigation policies, its adaptation poli-
cies remain inadequate and yet the Government's attention is fo-
cused on maintaining its emission rights, supported by financial and
technological capacities. 83
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: CLIMATE
CHANGE IN PERSPECTIVE
The Constitution of India was adopted in 1950, three years after
India's Independence; the Constitutional Drafting Committee con-
sidered several models, notably that of United Kingdom and the
79. Roger Harrabin, How Climate Change Hits India's Poor, (BBC News
television broadcast Feb. 1, 2007).
80. Sujoy Dhar, Environment-India: Rising Seas Threaten Bengal's Deltaic
People, Inter Press Service News Agency, June 4, 2007, http://ipsnews.net/
news.asp?idnews=38035.
81. Id; Harrabin, supra note 79.
82. See Gov't of India Ministry of Env't & Forests, India's Initial Nat'l
Commc'ns to the U. N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (2004),
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/indnc 1.pdf.
83. See generally Thomas Fuller & Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Deal Seems
Close, But Elusive, N.Y Times, Dec. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/world/i 5climate.html?scp= I0&sq=india%2
C+bali+and+climate+change. See also Summary of the Thirteenth Conference of
Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Third Meeting
of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, 3-15, December 2007, Earth Negotiations Bulle-
tin, Vol. 12, No. 354 (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Energy, Winnipeg, Manitoba,
Canada) available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12354e.pdf. India and
other developing countries made the finally accepted proposal that mitigation ac-
tion should be nationally appropriate based on technological and financial capac-
ity.
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United States, in determining the structure of governance and power
distribution among the Union Government (also referred to as Cen-
tral government) and State Governments. 84 However, one of the
most salient features, fundamental rights, was incorporated in Part
III of the Constitution.
The rights conferred under Part III are based on similar provisions
in other jurisdictions-the Bill of Rights in England and the United
States, and the Declaration of the Rights of Man in France.85 Consti-
tutional drafters were also influenced by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted in 1948.86 The final document
recognized six fundamental rights-to equality, 87 against exploita-
tion, to freedom of religion, education and cultural rights, 9 con-
stitutional remedies, 91 and right to freedom (of speech and expres-
sion, of peaceful assembly without arms, to association, of move-
ment, of residence, of profession or trade). 92
The rights were not only conferred because of the worldwide civil
liberties movement and rights movement of that period, but also in
response to deeply disturbing inequalities and social distortions
within the Indian society. For example, caste-based discrimination
left many groups without sufficient social, economic, and political
rights;93 speech and freedom had been curbed by the British admini-
stration in India, fearing civil unrest;94 and numerous discriminatory
84. See generally Durga Das Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India
(19th Ed, S. Asia Books 2007).
85. Id.
86. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
87. India Const. art. § 14.
88. Id. at art. 23-24. (Articles 23 and 24 prohibit trafficking human beings for
the purpose of slavery, prostitution, and child labor).
89. Id. at art. 25-28. (Articles 25 to 28 confer Indian citizens the right to free-
dom of religion, pursuant to the countries' adherence to secularism).
90. Id. at art. 29-30. (Articles 29 and 30 protect cultural rights of minorities,
including their language and religious practices).
91. This right is protected by Article 32, which allows citizens to file writ
petitions in case their fundamental rights are denied. Id. at art. 32.
92. Id. at art. 29-22. (Articles 19 through 22 confer a series of freedoms; nota-
bly, Article 21 grants the right to freedom of life and personal liberty).
93. See generally John McLeod, The History of India (Greenwood 2002). See
also Government of India, "Indian History, " Know India (2005),
http://india.gov.in/knowindia/ancient-history.php.
94. Mcleod supra note 93.
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cultural practices prevailed. 9 5 In an effort to reject such practices, the
Government of India not only passed legislation abolishing such vio-
lating norms and practices, but also rejected the basis for such prac-
tices through the fundamental rights provision.
96
While the Constitution guarantees Indians fundamental rights, they
are not necessarily unlimited. Fundamental rights are subject to con-
stitutional amendments; in fact, the right to property which was
originally included as a fundamental right was removed from Part III
and reconstituted as a general constitutional right under Article 300-
A.97 Further, in cases of emergency, the Government has the author-
ity to suspend these rights, including the right to judicial review, but
the power is subject to reasonable substantive and procedural safe-
guards. 98
To date, the Government of India has defended numerous funda-
mental rights petitions. 99 Moreover, the translation of the fundamen-
tal rights into practice remains an ongoing process even though the
Indian legislation has enacted several statutes on numerous issues
that are directly linked to fundamental rights. As discussed later,
innovative interpretation of substantive and procedural aspects of the
Constitution have become critical and indispensable for many Indi-
ans to realize their basic constitutional rights, be it better economic
and living conditions or sound environmental safeguards. 100
Climate change is an issue where mitigation legislation passed by
the Government addresses certain rights of the Indian community,
say, access to energy to promote personal liberty, but does not nec-
essarily protect all fundamental rights. Catastrophic events that may
be unraveled by climate change will not only have severe economic
95. For example, social norms such as preventing widows from remarrying
were prevalent in several parts of the country. Id.
96. The practice of birth-based caste discrimination practice of untouchability,
for instance, was abolished by the Untouchability Offences Act of 1955. Untouch-
ability (Offences) Act, Acts of Parliament No. 22 (1955). In addition, Article 17
specifically included such abolition with the Fundamental Rights chapter. India
Const. art. 17. See generally H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India: A Critical
Commentary, (N.M. Tripathi 4th ed., 1993) (1967).
97. The Constitution (Fourty-fourth Amendment) Act, Acts of Parliament No.
88 (1978), http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend44.htm. (By virtue of the
amendment, certain feudal type land ownership systems have been abolished). See
also Infra note 197.
98. Infra note 101.
99. Basu, supra note 84.
100. Infra note 127.
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repercussions, but also implicate constitutional rights of citizens. The
rights that will be affected are either fundamental rights under the
Indian Constitution, notably the Article 21 right to life, or rights that
the Supreme Court of India has held to be an integral part of Article
21,101 including rights to livelihood, 10 2 health, 10 3 and basic necessi-
ties. 1 4 Violation of fundamental rights is unconstitutional, if
abridged by the State' 05 without following "procedure established by
law."' 106 In the context of climate change, since there is no procedure
of law by which citizens can be denied these rights-contravention
of the rights constitutes a constitutional violation.
This emerging constitutional challenge is theoretically problem-
atic, because fundamental rights bind only the Republic of India'
07
and not foreign states. But, at this point many industrialized nations
that are responsible for the dangerous levels of GHG accumulations
are foreign states, as affirmed in the Kyoto Protocol. 108 Even if one
considers a scenario whereby India's emission increases add to the
problem by 2030, at present, that estimate shows that the country's
global share will be much lower than that of China, Europe or the
United States, for instance. 109 Thus, even if some portion of liability
could be attributed to the Indian Government, much of the responsi-
bility would lie with foreign States. There is no precedent of citizens
of India claiming redress from foreign nations for violating their
constitutional rights.
At the most, affected citizens could pursue statutory remedies in
certain jurisdictions. For instance, the U.S. Alien Torts Claim Statute
101. Article 21 states, "[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by law." India Const. art. 21.
102. See Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1548.
103. See Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802.
104. See Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 180.
105. Article 12 defines the Indian State to include, "the Government and Par-
liament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and
all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India." India Const. art. 12.
106. Under Article 21 read with Article 12(2), judicial review of governmental
action may be sought if a domestic law (defined under Article 13(3) to include
orders, notifications, by-laws, rules, etc.) contravenes the right to life and personal
liberty without complying with appropriate legal procedure. See generally, S.P.
Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol'y 29, 38
(2001) (explaining the judicial review under the Indian Constitution).
107. India Const., supra note 105.
108. UNFCCC, supra note 49.
109. CCPI, supra note 39.
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provides for foreign nationals to bring a torts action against U.S.
government and citizens for violation of international law, or "law of
nations.""l0 However, claimants must prove violation of interna-
tional law"' and not of their own domestic law, not even the Consti-
tution. Thus, in this case Indian citizens would have to demonstrate
that the U.S. government violated international law in causing cli-
mate change in India, 112 a claim that presents a range of evidentiary
and jurisprudential problems which most of the affected Indians will
find insurmountable.
As the discussion on climate change indicates, even the IPCC is
not yet entirely certain about the extent of temperature increases that
are natural as against that caused by anthropogenic emissions, and
the US has already made such an argument in a petition filed against
it before the UN Economic Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO). "3 Even if such distinction were possible, the burden
obviously lies with several States; if not the newly industrialized
countries such as China, Brazil or Indonesia, then certainly Austra-
lia, Canada, some European countries such as United Kingdom and
Germany, Japan and the United States, all of which have historically
110. 28U.S.C.§1350.
111. Id.
112. For a discussion of the Alien Torts Claims Act (ACTA), its scope and
limits, see Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the
Constitution, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 62 (1988); William S. Dodge, The Historical Ori-
gins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 Hastings Int'l
& Comp. L. Rev. 221 (1996); Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known But
Now a Door Ajar: An Overview of the Evolving and Dangerous Role of the Alien
Tort Statute in Human Rights and International Law Jurisprudence, 8 Chap. L.
Rev. 103 (2005). For a detailed analysis of the potential production of environ-
mental claims under the Act, see Russell Unger, Brandishing the Precautionary
Principle Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 N.Y.U. Envt'l L. J. 638 (2001).
113. In February 2006, the International Environmental Law Project at Lewis &
Clark School filed a petition before the UN World Heritage Committee of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), to
list the Waterton Glacier in Montana (shared with Canada) as a world heritage site
in danger from climate change, and require the United States to take steps to pre-
vent its destruction by curbing greenhouse gas emissions. In response to the peti-
tion, the United States argued that the glacier melting due to temperature increases
were also due to natural causes. For a discussion of the petition and the U.S. re-
sponse, see Bradford C. Mank, Civil Remedies, Global Climate Change and U.S.
Law 223-24, 253 (Michael Gerrard ed. 2007).
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contributed to the problem. 114 The acceptance of binding emissions
reduction targets by some nations does not necessarily exempt them
from liability at this point, because most of the major historic emit-
ters have not met their reduction targets." Thus, apportioning li-
ability would prove extremely difficult.
As such, despite a recent increase in ATCA claims in the human
rights arena, the response of U.S. district and appellate courts to
environmental suits has been tepid.117 Further, the exercise of judi-
cial power in determining what constitutes international law, includ-
ing customary law remains contentious,11 8 and invoking liability
under a treaty that the United States has specifically rejected seems
highly improbable. 119 Also, if other human rights claims such as that
of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference before the Inter-American Hu-
man Rights Commission are considered, the time taken for such dis-
pute resolution processes to be complete is discouraging. 120 At a
114. UNFCCC, Key GHG Data: Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions Data for
1990-2003 (submitted to the UNFCCC) at 16-17 (Nov. 2, 2005), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/keyghg.pdf.
115. Id.
116. For a list of all ATCA claims brought to date, see USA Engage, The Alien
Tort Provision: Correcting the Abuse of an Early Federalist Statute,
http://www.usaengage.org/legislative/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view
&id=220&Itemid=81 (last visited 2003).
117. For a discussion of recent ATCA environmental based claims and their
outcomes, see Bradford C. Mank, Civil Remedies, Global Climate Change and
U.S. Law (Michael Gerrard, ed. 2007).
118. In the United States, the debate with respect to ACTA has turned to the
issue of the extent of judicial powers over foreign policy and its implications for
the separation of powers, particularly in light of recent human rights litigation that
has been brought before U.S. courts. For a discussion on the debate on both sides,
see Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law? Ill Harv. L. Rev.
1824 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law As Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L.
Rev. 815; Donald J. Kochan, Constitutional Structure as a Limitation on the Scope
of the Law of Nations in the Alien Torts Claim Act, 31 Cornell L. J. 153 (1998).
119. A brief opinion note in fact argued for U.S. withdrawal from Kyoto to
avoid potential ACTA claims. See Christopher Homer and lain Murray, Why the
United States Should Remove its Signature from the Kyoto Protocol, CEI Monthly
Planet, September 29, 2004, http://www.globalwarming.org/node/738.
120. In December 2005, the chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC),
Sheila Watt-Cloutier brought an action claiming that the United States had vio-
lated the human rights of her people's right to livelihood and way of life, by caus-
ing climate change and the resultant melting of the ice in the Artic region, based
on a 2004 Artic Climate Impact Assessment prepared jointly by over 300 scien-
tists, with the participation of 15 countries and six indigenous groups. ICC also
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more theoretical level, issues of inter and intra generational justice
may crop up; for instance, Posner and Sunstein in a recent paper pre-
sent the question, why should future Americans pay for the future
sufferings of future Indians, for the actions of past Americans? 121
Under these circumstances, judicial review under the Indian Con-
stitution appears to be an important, perhaps the best, venue for citi-
zens to claim protection against and redress for violation of their
constitutional rights by acts foreign entities or states.
V. BUT, CAN THE INDIAN JUDICIARY INTERVENE?
The Indian judiciary is well placed to address constitutional chal-
lenges arising from climate change, primarily because of the public
interest litigation or epistolary jurisprudence that it has developed to
protect fundamental rights of Indians. The Indian Supreme Court has
provided some broad and innovative interpretation of laws in re-
sponse to practical problems such as costs of litigation and other re-
source constraints that made the judiciary, particularly higher courts
located in major cities, inaccessible to thousands of Indians.
Firstly, the Court has waived "ripeness" requirements for bringing
an action, on the ground that in a country where most people are un-
aware of their rights violations should be addressed before the actual
violation occurs. 122 Thus, the presence of a substantial threat of cli-
mate-related violations should be sufficient to invoke the Courts'
writ jurisdiction under Article 32.123
claimed violation also of UNFCCC and sought as relief, US ratification of Kyoto
and establishment of adaptation relief. The Commission has yet to admit the peti-
tion. See Mank, supra notel 13 at 221-223; Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as
a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous People's Rights,
31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 675 (2006-2007).
121. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, John M.
Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 354 (2d Series); Public Law and Le-
gal Theory Working Paper No. 177, available at http://ssm.com/abstract_
id=1008958.
122. See Nath v. Comm'r of Income Tax, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149 (holding that
waiver of fundamental rights could not be upheld in a country where many people
were ill-informed about their rights); see also Sathe, supra note 106, at 67.
123. Article 32 (1) states: [t]he right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
Article 32 provides for writ petitions such as mandamus and habeas corpus. India
Const. art. 32(1).
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Secondly, the Court has the authority to determine whether an in-
jury has occurred, 124 without relying on statutory enactments.
25
Further, petitioners need not satisfy the other two standing require-
ments under U.S. law, causation and redressability (remedy). 126
Thirdly, the Court can provide broad remedies, by issuing a writ of
mandamus not only ordering the government to perform non-
discretionary functions, or enjoining it from performing a statutorily
prohibited action, but also requiring it to perform discretionary func-
tions.127 Moreover, the Court can issue "continuing mandamus,"'
' 28
obligating the government to take specific actions and report pro-
gress on a regular basis, 129 as it has in the past.1
30
124. The Court has held that it has the authority to "decide whether proper pro-
cedure was prescribed by the legislature and followed by the executive" under
Article 21. Sathe, supra note 106, at 67.
125. This position differs from the U.S. Standing requirement, where injury-in-
fact is determined on the basis of statutory provisions. In fact, in the recent cli-
mate-related case, Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007), the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that injury-in-fact involved a substantive test based on statutory
rights and not on judicial determination of actual injury; see also Access to Courts
After Massachusetts v. EPA: Who Has Been Left Standing? 37 Envtl L. Rep. 10692
(September 2007) (discussing briefly the development of standing jurisprudence in
the United States, leading up to the Supreme Court's recent decision regarding the
power of EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions).
126. See Lujan v. Defender's of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (explaining each
of the tests). Although the Indian judiciary followed a three prong test similar to
the United States law, it relaxed these requirements in S.P. Gupta v. President of
India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149, in which the executive arbitrarily transferred judges
for their opinions, threatening the independence of the judiciary. The Court low-
ered standing requirements, but also held that the fundamental right to freedom of
speech and expression enshrined in Art. 19(1) of the Constitution included the
right to information. Further, the Court ruled that the Government was required to
consult with the Chief Justice and other judges before appointing judges, even
though the final decision remained with the executive. See also Sathe supra note
106, at 70, 96, 102.
127. Sathe, supra note 106, at 23.
128. Id. at 82.
129. Sathe, supra note 106 (discussing the orders issued by the Court to the
Central Bureau of Investigation in Vineet Narain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996
S.C. 3386, and Union of India v. Sushil Kumar Modi, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 314).
130. For instance in Kishen v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 677, the Court
ordered the Government to prevent death by poverty and starvation. Similarly, in
the Azad Riksha Pullers case, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 14, the Court ordered the Punjab
National Bank to give loans to auto riksha pullers, following a government order
that only owners of rikshas could legally ply the vehicles. Instead of striking down
the Government order, the Court arrangements for the majority of auto riksha wal-
lahs, who did not own a vehicle, to acquire rikshas.
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Due to the above rulings, the Indian judiciary is considered to be
one of the most powerful courts in the world. In fact, in comparison
US courts are far more restrained by the separation of powers doc-
trine enshrined in the Constitution. 13 Further, in the case of envi-
ronmental issues, representative suits may generally be brought
against State agencies within the scope of a given statute. 1
32
Fourthly, any person with "sufficient interest"' 33 in helping poor
and vulnerable sections of the population can seek judicial review on
behalf of victims of fundamental rights violations. 134 In the alterna-
tive, the Court can assume suo motto jurisdiction by treating letters
or newspaper reports as writ petitions.
In addition to the procedural flexibilities, the Court's substantive
interpretation of fundamental rights, based on non-binding constitu-
tional law provisions, 36 on foreign decisions and international law
131. Sathe, supra note 106.
132. See generally Access to Courts After Massachusetts v. EPA: Who Has
Been Left Standing? 37 Envtl L. Rep. 10692 (September 2007).
133. As a result, non-governmental organizations and public interest lawyers
have filed many writ petitions on behalf of those affected, which the Court had
balanced by allowing only genuine petitions and not mala fide actions. Sathe, su-
pra note 106, 81.
134. See Morcha v. India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802. The Court observed that judi-
cial review proceedings to enforce fundamental rights were not limited to any
person or proceedings under Article 32(1) of the Constitution. The Court has taken
such a broad approach to ensure that rights of Indians who are not in a position to
claim fundamental rights protection enjoy full constitutional protection. Judges in
the Supreme Court, notably Justice P.N. Bhagawati, view public interest litigation
as a means for poor, under-informed, and underprivileged Indians to access expen-
sive judicial systems, and the judiciary must therefore open up access through
flexible rules. See P.N. Bhagawati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litiga-
tion, 23 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 561 (1085). See also Jeremy Cooper, Poverty and
Constitutional Justice, 44 Mercer L. Rev. 611 (1993).
135. See Batra v. Delhi Admin., A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1675, in which the Court
treated a letter from a prisoner complaining about prison conditions as a writ peti-
tion seeking to enforce fundamental rights; see also P. UD.R. v. India A.I.R. 1982
S.C. 1473.
136. Directive principles contained in Part IV of Constitution set out non-
binding goals, such as free legal aid, gender non-discrimination, compulsory edu-
cation, and provision for livelihood, for the Government to implement. Article 37
states: "[t]he provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any
court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the
governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these prin-
ciples in making laws." See also Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Bd. v. Nayuda
2 S.C.C. 718 (1999); Mehta v. Union of India, 2 S.C.C. 256 (1992); Pandey v.
West Bengal, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1109.
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and principles, 137 also provide adequate room for a constitution
claim. Over the years the Court has read into fundamental rights
provisions, a range of ancillary rights-livelihood, 138 health, 3 9 basic
necessities, 140 travel abroad 141 and privacy. 1
42
The possibility of successfully proceeding with a climate change
claim also appears favorable in light of the Court's invocation of
epistolary jurisdiction to address several environmental concerns,
including protecting the Taj Mahal from coal and coke pollution; 43
cleaning up the Ganga; 144 relocating hazardous industries in
Delhi; 145 curbing vehicular pollution, 146 requiring compulsory envi-
ronmental education, 47 and re-directing an illegally diverted
137. See Indian Councilfor Enviro-LegalAction, 5 S.C.C. 212 (1996) (holding
that the polluter pays principle was law of the land); Vellore Citizen's Welfare
Forum v. Union of India, 5 S.C.C. 647 (1996) (holding the precautionary principle
was part of India's environmental laws); Mehta v. Nath, infra note 148 (using the
Roman law doctrine of public trust, as applied by the Supreme Court of California
in Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983)). Also, for a
study of trends in the Indian judiciary's use of international and foreign decisions,
see, Adam M. Smith, Making Itself at Home Understanding Foreign Law in Do-
mestic Jurisprudence: The Indian Case, 24 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 218, 240
(2006)(providing statistics demonstrating that the Supreme Court's reliance on
foreign law, not just British law, has declined since 1990s, even though it relied
heavily on Privy Council decisions in the 1950s).
138. See Hoskot v. State of Maharstra, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1533.
139. See Morcha v. India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802.
140. See Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 180.
141. See Singh v. Asst. Passport Officer, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1836; Gandhi v. Un-
ion of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597(arguing that the Government violated petition-
ers Art. 21 right to personal liberty by impounding her passport).
142. See Singh v. State of UP., A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1295 (holding that personal
liberty implied the right to privacy); see also Sathe, supra note 106, at 51-57, for a
detailed discussion on the interpretation of Article 21 by the Supreme Court.
143. Mehta v. Union of India, 2 SCC 353 (1997).
144. Mehta v. Union of India, 6 S.C.C. 63 (1998).
145. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 5 S.C.C. 281. The Court ordered the
closure and relocation of more than 1300 major polluting hazardous industries
from Delhi to sites in neighboring states. See Mehta v. Union of India 6 S.C.C. 63
(1998).
146. Mehta v. Union of India, 6 S.C.C. 12 (1999); Mehta v. Union of India, 4
S.C.C. 359 (2002). In both cases, the Court ordered the Government to implement
Euro I and II standards for reducing automobile pollution. Further, in a far reach-
ing case, the Court ordered that all public buses be run on compressed natural gas
to reduce pollution.
147. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 103; Mehta v. Union of India 6
S.C.C. 63 (1998).
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river, 14 8 among others. 49 The Court has also proven adept in cata-
lyzing executive action on several issues.' 
50
Thus, theoretically the Indian judiciary has the capacity to address
potential climate change related violations of fundamental rights.
VI. LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Although the Court could assume jurisdiction to address the prob-
lem of potential violation of fundamental rights because of climate
change, it will not be able to provide adequate remedies within the
current framework of its jurisprudence, since the Court has no juris-
diction over foreign States under the Indian Constitution. An Article
32 judicial review is available only in the case of violation of fun-
damental rights by Indian governments. 151 Thus, at this juncture the
Court can at the most direct the Government's international negotia-
tions. In such an event, the Court will be intervening with the Gov-
ernment's exercise of foreign affairs powers.
148. See Mehta v. Nath, A.I.R. 2000 6 S.C.C. 213 (Mehta challenged the diver-
sion of the river Beas by a Hotel, in which close relatives of Kamal Nath, the Min-
ister of Environment and Forests, held shares. The Court held that disturbing the
"basic environment," such as air and water, constituted a violation of the right to
life, which encompassed preservation of ecological balance. Incidentally, Kamal
Nath is now the Minister of Trade, representing India in the UK- led coalition
GLOBE, to address the problem of global warming and climate change). See G8 +
8 Climate Change Dialogue, Brussels Legislators Forum, GLOBE International,
www.globeinternational.org.
149. An overview of all the cases brought by M.C. Mehta regarding environ-
mental protection at the M.C. Mebta Environmental Foundation, available at
http://www.mcmef.org/landmark.htm.
150. See Mehta v. Union ofIndia 6 S.C.C. 63 (1998) (a Delhi Pollution Case, in
which the Court set up a Committee to advise it on the implications of shifting
from traditional fuel to compressed natural gas (CNG) for public buses, and or-
dered all related government agencies to coordinate with each other, and moni-
tored the implementation by requiring periodic requirements). See also Thirmul-
pad v. Union of India, 5 S.C.C. 57 (2006), the Court issued a series of orders re-
garding the management of national forests.
151. Article 12 states: "In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, 'the
State' includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and
the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the
territory of India or under the control of Government of India." India Const. art.
12. "In this Part" refers to the section on Fundamental Rights. India Const. art. 32.
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The Constitution vests foreign affairs powers exclusively with the
Central government. 152 It grants the Parliament, which is the legisla-
tive branch, 153 the power to enact laws regarding foreign affairs, 
154
including conclusion of legal arrangements. 155 However, in practice,
the Executive 56 enters into and implements treaties and interna-
tional obligations,1 57 and the Parliament has the power to enact exe-
cuting domestic legislation. 58 No provision of the Indian Constitu-
152. The subject matters with respect to which the State and Central govern-
ment have jurisdiction are listed in the Seventh Schedule. List I sets out areas for
the Central Government, List II, the States, and List III for both the State and Cen-
tral governments, even though the Central government has preemptory powers in
case of overlap or conflict. The Central government also has residuary powers
regarding subject matters that are not covered in Lists II and III. See India Const.
art. 246, 254.
153. The Parliament is composed of the President and two Houses-the Council
of States and House of People. See India Const. art. 79.
154. However, because the President heads the Executive branch and is also
part of the Legislature, the division of powers under the Indian Constitution is
considered a mix of both the British and the U.S. systems. See Thomas M. Franck
& Arun K. Thiruvengadam, International Law and Constitution-Making, 2 Chi-
nese J. Int'l. L. 468, 483 (2003).
155. List I, Item 10 lists foreign affairs as, "all matters which bring the union
into relation with any foreign country." India Const. Sched. 7 List 1. A series of
foreign affairs- related powers are listed in List I-e.g., preventive detention with
respect to foreign affairs (Item 9); treaty-making and implementation (Item 14);
"foreign jurisdiction" (Item 16); and foreign exchange and foreign loans (Items 36,
37). Id.
156. The executive branch is headed by the President. The President is advised
by a Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister. See India Const. art. 74.
157. A similar practice has been observed in the United States. See G. Edward
White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85
Va. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1999) (arguing against exclusive Federal Executive authority
to pursue foreign affairs).
158. See Franck & Thiruvengadam, supra note 154, at 483-84. According to the
authors, the Indian practice bears the mark of British practice. They note that by
reading Article 73, 246, 253 and Entry 14 of List I, Schedule VII that "the execu-
tive power of the Union government is co-extensive with the legislative power in
the matter of entering into, and implementation of, treaties." Id. The Indian posi-
tion on foreign affairs powers resembles that of the United States to the extent that
the Congress, the legislative and executive branches both have some powers re-
lated to foreign affairs, which they could exercise in cooperation, or not. However,
the extent of power of each branch remains subject to discussion. Also controver-
sial is the extent of foreign policy powers relegated by States (which in India is not
a concern since States are not vested with foreign affairs powers under Lists II or
III of the Seventh Schedule to the Indian Constitution). See White, supra note 157
(for a discussion on the evolution of foreign affairs jurisprudence in the United
States).
[VOL. XIX
2009] CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 29
tion explicitly grants the judiciary the authority to review matters
related to foreign affairs. In fact, the judiciary is specifically ex-
cluded from adjudicating international disputes, 159 except for advis-
ing the President upon request. 60
In fact, in Novartis v. Union of India, the High Court of Chennai
(appellate court) held that it did not have the jurisdiction to decide
whether the Indian Patent Act, 1970 complied with the Agreement
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPs).
16 1
Based on an early U.S. Supreme Court decision, the Court decided
that where Governments had entered into an international agreement
that contained a dispute settlement clause, they were bound by such
a contract and not to domestic court jurisdiction. In another instance,
the Court had also held that it does not have the authority to compel
the Government to enact national laws executing its international
law obligations, and that where such laws are absent rights created
under the corresponding treaty cannot be enforced by the courts. 1
62
Yet, as argued by scholars the Indian Supreme Court has placed
checks on the executive treaty-making power in the past.163 For in-
159. Article 363, which reads as follows: Bar to interference by courts in dis-
putes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc.-(1) Notwithstanding any-
thing in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of article 143, neither the
Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising
out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other
similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement
of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government
of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party and
which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any
dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising
out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agree-
ment, covenant, engagement, sanad or similar instrument. India Const. art. 363.
The limitation on the jurisdiction is also reiterated in the provision to Article 131,
which provides for original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. India Const. art.
131.
160. Article 143 reads as follows: Power of President to consult Supreme
Court.-(1) If at any time it appears to the President that a question of law or fact
has arisen, or it is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and of such public im-
portance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it, he
may refer the question to that Court for consideration and the Court may, after
such hearing as it thinks fit, report to the President its opinion thereon. India
Const. art. 143.
161. W.P. Nos. 24759 and 24760, June 8, 2007.
162. See Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, 2 S.C.C. 360 (1980).
163. See. Franck and Thiruvengadam, International Law and Constitution-
Making, 2 Chinese J. Int'l. L. 468, 483 (2003).
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stance, in Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, 164 the Court held
that the government does not have the authority to use its foreign
affairs provision to unilaterally withdraw recognition of royalty
status to former princes. 165 Thus, unlike in the United States, 6 6 the
judiciary has not consistently held that foreign affairs are a preroga-
tive of the Executive branch subject only to limited intervention
from the legislative branch. As discussed earlier, it has in fact relied
on international instruments such as UDHR 16 7 to give effect to fun-
damental rights. 1
68
Further, the Supreme Court's reasoning in developing epistolary
jurisdiction supports an argument in favor of judicial intervention in
foreign affairs. The judiciary interpreted locus standi liberally, be-
cause the Court believed that the promises of a constitutional democ-
racy were beyond the reach of many Indians due to financial and
cultural constraints.169 Judges who pioneered public interest litiga-
tion reasoned that in a society where oppression and poverty were
164. A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 530.
165. See Burt Neubome, The Supreme Court of India, 1 Int'l J. Const. L. 476,
487-92 (2003).
166. In the United States, foreign matters are generally excluded from judicial
review under the political question doctrine. However, recent cases United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004), and the position of noted scholars in favor judicial intervention constant
bring the question back for reconsideration. For an overview of the U.S. position,
see, Thomas Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law
Apply to Foreign Affairs? (1992); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are
Foreign Affairs Different? Book Review, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1980 (1993) (review-
ing the implications for Thomas Franck's argument against the political question
doctrine limitation on judicial review); see also Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of
Foreign Affairs, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 941 (2004) (for an overview of the various issues
related to foreign affairs powers of the judiciary and the need for a more reasoned
approach that would allow the judiciary to address foreign affairs).
167. See Keshavananda Bharati; A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 537 (the Supreme Court
held, that to the extent possible, the Constitution of India should take into consid-
eration and give effect to the United Nations Charter and UDHR). See also Ja-
balpur v. Shukla A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207 (minority opinion); Hasia v. Mujib A.I.R.
1981 S.C. 487; Vishaka v. State ofRajasthan A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 2304.
168. See P.N. Bhagawati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 561 (1985).
169. See also Ashutosh Varshney, Democracy vs. Growth in India, Foreign
Affairs, 93 (2007) (discussing current challenges to democracy in India).
[VOL. XIX
2009] CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 31
cultural norms, most people would not have the knowledge or the
means to claim their constitutional rights. 
170
None of these conditions have changed, despite India's economic
growth. India remains home to some of the poorest people in the
world. According to the 2005 United Nations Human Development
Index (HDI), India was ranked 128 among all countries; 171 despite a
GDP that was higher than that of Tajikistan (3530 v. 1370), India
was ranked relatively lower in the HDI (0.68 v. 0.62). 172 Reportedly,
the subcontinent also contains some of the most polluted and haz-
ardous sites on the planet. 173 Administrative systems remain cor-
rupt 174 and access to courts remains abysmal, expensive and slow.' 
75
In other words, a large percentage of Indians remain vulnerable to
climate change-related violations of their fundamental rights, with-
out redress. Thus, the Indian judiciary would be justified in exercis-
ing its jurisdiction to intervene in foreign affairs, to safeguard cli-
mate change related violations within Article 32.
170. See id.; see also Maureen B. Callahan, Cultural Relativism and the Inter-
pretation of Constitutional Texts, 30 Willamette L. Rev. 609 (1994) (arguing
drafters of the Indian Constitution sought to transform the society).
171. According to the 2007/2008 UNDP Human Poverty Index, India is ranked
6 2nd among the 108 developing countries; poverty is not merely measured in terms
of people living below $1 a day, but also in terms of the percentage of people
without, say, drinking water, which is currently at 14%. United Nations Develop-
ment Index 2005, United Nations Development Reports, Human Poverty in India:
Focusing on the Most Deprived in Multiple Dimensions of Poverty,
http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/countryfact-sheets/cty fs IND.html.
172. Id.
173. Fiona Harvey, Planets Most Polluted Sites Unveiled, Financial Times,
Sept. 13, 2007, at 4. India, with China and Russia, was reported to contain most
contaminated sites, including toxic mining sites.
174. See generally Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Burden of Democracy (2003); see
also, Toral Patel, Corrupt Practices in India: No Payoff, 20 Loy. L.A. Int'l &
Comp. L. J. 389, 398, 1998; But see Report on the Transparency International
Global Corruption Barometer, Transparency International, Dec. 7, 2006. (noting,
however, some improvements).; Wolfgang Schurer, A Geopolitical and Geo-
Economic Overview: On the Rise of China and India as Two Asian Giants, 29-
SUM Fletcher F. World Aff. 145, 158 (2005) (noting that despite problems of
administrative corruption the "new cabinet in New Delhi has an impeccable anti-
corruption record and that India is well on its way to building both domestic and
international trust in its legal and regulatory climate.").
175. See Ashish S. Prasad & Violeta I. Balan, Strategies for U.S. Companies to
Mitigate Legal Risks from Doing Business in India, Corp. L. & Prac. Course
Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 11926, Feb.-Mar. 2007.
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However, short of directing the Government international climate
negotiations and policies, there is little that the Indian judiciary can
do by way of shielding fundamental rights from climate change vio-
lations, without risking its legitimacy. 176 If and when the violations
actually occur, the Court could order the Government to pursue in-
ternational adjudication, but as current evidence suggests, interna-
tional adjudication has limited utility.1 77 International principles,
under which remedy could be claimed, such as the duty to prevent
trans-boundary pollution, even though interpreted as customary in-
ternational law in the Trial Smelter Arbitration, 78 are not complied
with by States. 179
Indeed, a domestic legislation prohibiting certain actions and con-
sequences may be the best response, if one considers the decision in
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals Ltd., 8 ' (Pakootas). In Pakootas,
the Court held that smelter industries that released hazardous waste
into the Washington River, with proper permits from Canadian envi-
ronmental authorities, were liable under a U.S. law on hazardous
waste. 181 The Court held that even though the waste was released on
176. As such there are criticisms that the judiciary has ignored the separation of
powers doctrine. See Armin Rosencranz & Michael Jackson, The Delhi Pollution
Case: The Supreme Court of India and the Limits of Judicial Power, 28 Colum. J.
Envtl. L. 223 (2003) (arguing that although intervention to abate Delhi's pollution
was timely, the Court undermined the development of administrative capacity to
address environmental matters by usurping executive functions). See also Peter
Waldman, Jurist's Prudence India's Supreme Court Makes Rule of Law A Way of
Governing: Splintered Political System Leaves Judges to Battle Corruption and
Pollution, Wall St. J., May 6, 1996.
177. See generally CESARE P. ROMANO, THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 39-41 (Kluwer Law Intl 2000).
178. See Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of
Smelter at Trail, U.S.-Ca., Apr. 15, 1935, B.C. U.S. Treaty Series No. 893, avail-
able at http://www.lfip.org/laws666/trailsm.htm.
179. Daniel Bodansky, Customary (And Not So Customary) International Envi-
ronmental Law, 3 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 105, 116 (1995).
180. Pakootas v. Teck Coinco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (C.A.9 (Wash.)
2006). The Supreme Court recently rejected a review petition upon the recom-
mendation of the Solicitor General on the grounds that the issue was moot since
the EPA had withdrawn the order, making the Appellate Court decision moot, and
that in any case, the matter was appropriately decided taking into account the facts
of the case and scope of the law. See Teck Cominco Metals Ltd. v. Pakootas, 128
S.Ct. 858 (2008). The Solicitor General's brief is available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2007/2pet/6invit/2006-1188.pet.ami.inv.pdf.
181. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9603.
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the Canadian side the companies responsible for the pollution were
liable to clean up the waste in the United States, since the effects
were felt within the U.S. It also held that the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency had a non-discretionary duty to enforce CERCLA
against the companies. 1
82
In effect, the U.S. Court extended the scope of a national legisla-
tion to a foreign entity, for acts committed outside of the United
States on the ground that the effects were felt in the United States. In
arriving at the conclusion, the Court rejected the companies' argu-
ment that they were not responsible for the flow of the river, which
essentially carried the waste from Canadian soil, and noted that
Washington taxpayers ought not to bear the economic burden for
external actions.' 
83
While the case reflects a long history of cross-border pollution in-
volving Canada and United States, including failed diplomatic inter-
ventions to adequately address the problem,'1 84 the rationale for the
judgment nevertheless provides an important lesson. It demonstrates
that domestic legislation can be the most accessible safeguard
against individual rights violations, as opposed to international
remedies. Hence, the Indian Court could draw on Pakootas and or-
der the Indian government to pass legislation on climate change that
hold persons or States responsible for climate change liable to re-
dress constitutional rights violations, and compensate those who
consequently suffer economic losses.
However, such legislation can be diplomatically undesirable.
Moreover, the Government has traditionally been reluctant to enact
any legislation that could curb development, or been unsuccessful in
litigating on behalf of those affected, as demonstrated by two critical
cases discussed below.
182. Supra note 180.
183. For an analysis of the history of smelter waste-related disputes between the
U.S. and Canada and the Ninth Circuit decision, see, Michael J. Robinson-Dom,
The Trial Smelter: Is What's Past Prologue? EPA Blazes a New Trial for
CERCLA, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 233 (2006).
184. See generally Transboundary Harm in International Law (Rebecca M.
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds. 2006).
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The Bhopal gas leak incident1 85 illustrates the inability of the gov-
ernment and the legal system to adequately deliver justice to citi-
zens. Following the gas leak, the Indian Government passed the
Bhopal Act 186 to consolidate the thousands of civil suits brought be-
fore Indian and U.S. courts and to represent the interest of its citizens
against a foreign entity, based on the parens patriae doctrine. 187 The
Act not only allowed the Government to act on behalf of its citizens,
but also provided mechanisms for distribution of compensation
among victims.
However, the litigation remained contentious because the Gov-
ernment brought an action before the District Court of New York
instead of its own courts, on the ground that a foreign entity was in-
volved and that its own courts lacked the capacity to redress the mat-
ter.188 However, the New York court dismissed the claim for forum
non conveniens reasons.189 Eventually, the case was brought before
the Madhya Pradesh High Court, based on the Indian rule of absolute
liability.1 90 But, after much bargaining on both sides, the Indian gov-
ernment settled the matter in 1989 with the Union Carbide Company
agreeing to pay the government $465 million, of which the Indian
subsidiary paid $45 million.
The settlement not only led to criticisms about the government
bargaining away the rights and claims of thousands of victims, but
185. On December 3, 1984, at a pesticide plant of Union Carbide India Limited
located in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, a tank holding 43 tons of toxic methyl isocy-
nate (MIC) was released due to an allegedly accidental mixture with water. The
gas killed about 2,100 people instantly and injured 200,000. Considered one of the
world's worst industrial disasters, the accident was magnified by the absence of
proper medical and other response to curb and reverse the damage, as well as by
inadequate safety standards in the first place. The harm suffered by most victims
remains uncompensated to date. Infra note 187.
186. The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act of 1985, avail-
able at http://www.commonlii.org/in/legis/num-act/bgldoca1985390.
187. For an overview of Bhopal, the role of the Government, and the aftermath,
see, Tim Covell, The Bhopal Disaster Litigation: Its Not Over Yet, 16 N.C.J. Int'l
L. & Com. Reg. 279(1991).
188. The Union Carbide Company held nearly half the shares in the company,
id.
189. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); aff'd in 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
190. Based on the strict liability rule, under the absolute liability rule any multi-
national enterprise carrying on hazardous activities is liable for damage resulting
from such activity, and cannot claim any of the exceptions available under the
original rule. See Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak case), A.I.R. 1987
S.C. 1086. For a discussion of the settlement process, see, Covell, supra note 187.
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also the actual distribution of compensation, especially since a large
portion of the victims and their families have not received any to this
day. 191
Similarly, Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Oth-
ers,192 involving the damming of the Narmada River, popularly
known as the Sardar Sarovar or the Narmada Dam projects, 193 show-
cases the inadequacy of legal protection for Indians affected by natu-
ral resource abuses. Most people displaced by rising water levels
remain without adequate compensation, primarily because the issue
of land-related displacement, which is governed by the British-era
191. A chronology of the case and its present status has been posted by Union
Carbide Company at http://www.bhopal.com/chrono.htm. See also, World
'failed" Bhopal Gas Victims, Nov. 29, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south asia/4050739.stm.
192. Andolan v. Union ofIndia, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 319 (representatives of people
who stood to be displaced by the dam construction; several villages were set iden-
tified for flooding, brought a public interest litigation arguing violation of funda-
mental rights because of the project).
193. The Sardar Sarovar project began in 1946, prior to Independence, but ran
into problems with respect to rights of riparian states, the height of the dam, costs,
and power distribution. The Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal was established to
resolve the issues, which reviewed environmental, social and economic impact
statements before granting a Final Award, specifically requiring the Government
to allocate alternative lands to people whose lands would be submerged, one year
before carrying out the submergence, even though no specifications were made
with respect to place of rehabilitation. The State of Gujarat as the main beneficiary
was required to take on much of the burden. The World Bank entered into a loan
arrangement in 1985 with the Indian government to fund large portions of the
dam, which accelerated the project. However, the rehabilitation process lagged
behind critically, especially since many of the displaced either did not own the
land they depended on, or did not possess the proper land transfer papers. As vil-
lages flooded, large communities were left without remedy. The apathy of the
situation commanded international attention, resulting finally in the World Bank
establishing an independent fact finding committee, which concluded that the en-
vironmental and social impacts of the dam far exceeded the benefits. In light of the
report and internal and international pressure, the Bank withdrew from the Project
in 1993. The Government of India, however, sought to continue. The issue is far
from settled as documentation regarding those affected continues to present in-
creasing evidence of a severely botched effort to balance environmental, social,
and economic concerns. In fact, the protests surrounding the Narmada Dam project
resulted in the creation of a World Commission on Dams, which reported that
large dams were unviable development solutions. See Komala Ramachandra,
Sardar Sarovar: An Experience Retained?, 19 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 275 (2006). See
also http://narrnada.org.
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Land Acquisition Act, 1894,194 confers on the government the right
to take private property in public interest, by paying "adequate"
compensation calculated according the legislation.' 95 In fact, once a
government determines that a parcel has to be acquired for public
purpose; one can only appeal the amount of compensation.' 
96
Moreover, given the complex caste system and the remnants of a
near feudal-like land ownership system in India, especially in rural
areas, many farmers either lease or simply work on the land, and
may not be entitled to compensation. 197 Rehabilitation programs are
plagued by administrative gaps and delays, as State governments fail
to fully and timely comply with awards given by the Narmada Tri-
bunal and judicial intervention is limited. 198
Both Bhopal and Narmada are but two well-known instances of
administrative failures and judicial inefficacy to prevent, protect
against and adequately redress constitutional violations of thousands
of Indians. Rights violations occur routinely in India, 199 and there is
no indication at this point that such violations will be prevented or
compensated when climate change-related catastrophes unravel, es-
pecially if the incidents in the Sunderbans are any indication.200
194. A copy of the legislation is available at http://punjablaws.gov.pk/
laws/12.html.
195. For a discussion of the problems with the land acquisition law in India and
takings jurisprudence, see generally Pooja Mehta, Internally-Displaced Persons
and the Sardar Sarovar Project: A Case for Rehabilitative Reform in Rural India,
20 Am. U. Int'l. L. Rev. 613 (2005). See also S. Parasuraman, The Development
Dilemma: Displacement in India, 40-41, 58 (1992).
196. Land Acquisition Act, §§ 4-12 (1984).
197. See generally Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Permeability of Constitutional
Borders, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1763,1767 (2004) (referring to India as an "essentially
feudal society"). Property rights were initially part of fundamental rights, but have
since then been repealed. Yet, the zamindari system that was recognized by the
British government in India perpetuated a feudal approach to land ownership.
Amendments in several states to redistribute the land by abolishing this system
through a series of constitutional amendments have led to constitutional challenges
based on the amount of compensation, which is now generally not subject to chal-
lenge. For a discussion of the key cases that shaped the constitutional jurispru-
dence of property in India, see, Neubome, supra note 165, at 490. See also Tho-
mas Allen, Commonwealth Constitutions and Right not to be Deprived of Prop-
erty, 42 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 523 (1993) (discussing the challenges that judiciaries
face in interpreting property rights and the role the influence of property jurispru-
dence among Commonwealth countries, including India).
198. Pooja Mehta, supra note 195.
199. Neubome, supra note 165.
200. Supra notes 79, 80.
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More importantly, the Indian judiciary, which has earned the title of
201Supreme Court for Indians, may be facing the limits of its capac-
ity to deliver justice.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As the fifth largest emitter of carbon dioxide, India's participation
and engagement is critical to the future of an effective international
climate regime, particularly when one considers the potential effects
that a rapidly growing hydrocarbon economy of a billion plus people
can have on the global emissions, and hence the climate. This is a
legitimate concern and one that requires attention; and indeed, the
Indian government has been responsive and is presently ahead in the
curve of mitigation trends. However, India's efforts to mitigate cli-
mate change, or for that matter taking an international position chal-
lenging industrialized countries to reduce emissions, cannot ensure
that fundamental rights of millions of Indians will be protected if
there is a two or more degrees Celsius increase in global tempera-
ture.
This emerging constitutional challenge in the case of climate
change illustrates that the focus on limiting international obligations
to reduce emissions could potentially undermine a foundational
document of not only nations' legal system, but its entire form of
governance; the fine balance between the rights of people and the
constraints over government powers. 20 2 Moreover, in India, the judi-
ciary assumed great powers and provided broad interpretations and
remedies to fill an important void in governance-the inability of a
substantial number of Indians to fully participate in constitutional
government and exercise their rights. In other words, courts added
certain "welfare rights" that could not could not be delivered by a
pure "social-citizenship rights" conception of the Constitution. 203
201. Upendra Baxi, Constitutionalism as a Site of State Formative Practices, 21
Cardozo L. Rev. 1183, 1205 (2000).
202. See generally Henry W. Andersen, The Constitution An Expanding Char-
ter of Government, 18 B.U. L. Rev. 491 (1938).
203. See Frank I. Michelman, Democracy-Based Resistance to a Constitutional
Right of Social Citizenship: A Comment on Forbath, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1893
(2000-2001) (discussing the need for judicial interpretation of Constitution to en-
sure protection of welfare rights, as opposed to social-citizenship, whereby proc-
esses of democratic governance would address welfare concerns as well).
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But, when these rights can no longer be effectively preserved even
by expansive judicial review because of events beyond the control of
Courts the efficacy of constitutional governance, in particular fun-
damental rights, is imperiled. The challenge for India is therefore not
merely that of preserving their right to emit carbon dioxide or de-
velop, or even that of mitigating climate change, but of preserving
their constitutional government. And, this concern should also be
reflected in treaty negotiations following Bali.
